“Operations MI and AL were the unhappy outcome of a lack of real strategic direction on the part of the Japanese military, and the Imperial Navy in particular, in early 1942. To a large degree, these difficulties stemmed from Japan’s unforeseen success during the first four months of war. By March 1942, Japan had either attained all of her initial objectives or was in sight of doing so.”(19) Japans army and Navy loathed each other; they could not agree nor get along with one another for any reasonable time. This caused several issues with commanded and planning when it came time for the next major battle. “The Navy had too few troops to do any real “heavy lifting” of its own and therefore had to rely on the Army if it wanted to secure important objectives. The Army recognized that it had an important say in such matters, and it intended to use this leverage. Unfortunately, whereas most nations’ interservice relationships range from bad to worse, Japans were mired at the dysfunctional end of the spectrum.”(25) Japan again, assuming their attack on Pearl Harbor had caused America to become afraid or perhaps weakened made a terrible mistake, they thought that America would not attack and would be easily defeated. Japan thought they had sunk most of America’s top carriers or they were stationed in the Atlantic. Japan felt they had the upper hand when it came time to attack Midway, with their calculations America only had five carriers. “However, since it was (presumably) unthinkable that the Americans would have a clear sense for Japanese intentions, it was considered equally unlikely that all five would be in the same location when the Japanese attacked”
“Operations MI and AL were the unhappy outcome of a lack of real strategic direction on the part of the Japanese military, and the Imperial Navy in particular, in early 1942. To a large degree, these difficulties stemmed from Japan’s unforeseen success during the first four months of war. By March 1942, Japan had either attained all of her initial objectives or was in sight of doing so.”(19) Japans army and Navy loathed each other; they could not agree nor get along with one another for any reasonable time. This caused several issues with commanded and planning when it came time for the next major battle. “The Navy had too few troops to do any real “heavy lifting” of its own and therefore had to rely on the Army if it wanted to secure important objectives. The Army recognized that it had an important say in such matters, and it intended to use this leverage. Unfortunately, whereas most nations’ interservice relationships range from bad to worse, Japans were mired at the dysfunctional end of the spectrum.”(25) Japan again, assuming their attack on Pearl Harbor had caused America to become afraid or perhaps weakened made a terrible mistake, they thought that America would not attack and would be easily defeated. Japan thought they had sunk most of America’s top carriers or they were stationed in the Atlantic. Japan felt they had the upper hand when it came time to attack Midway, with their calculations America only had five carriers. “However, since it was (presumably) unthinkable that the Americans would have a clear sense for Japanese intentions, it was considered equally unlikely that all five would be in the same location when the Japanese attacked”