One problem in Locke’s ideas is whether or not consciousness alone is a necessary condition for sameness of personal identity, meaning that an individual is only the same person if they have a conscious memory of an action performed by them. By Locke’s logic, any individual in the future could have a conscious memory of an action performed by another individual from these times, and therefore be the same person, but not the same human – and therefore would not be punished for any negative actions performed by the individual from the past. However, Locke also wrote that it is possible for substance and personal identity to transfer to other humans, which would mean that in the future another individual could be punished for the other individual’s actions even though they have no conscious memory of ever having performed it. These reasons suggest that unlike Locke argues, having a conscious memory of the past alone, cannot be the only necessary condition for being the same person. This is because there are many scenarios where most would consider an individual the same person, but they may not be conscious of it, and there are many scenarios where a person appears to have a conscious memory of being someone else, but is not the same person. Furthermore, it is possible for an individual to have a memory of an action performed by another individual, in which they feel conscious of …show more content…
She argues that despite Locke’s argument seeming to be consistent with the laws of morality, he actually does not reveal anything about morality or materiality of the soul, as he does not mention the afterlife or accountability for one’s actions in the afterlife. This is clear, as because Locke argues that substance and personal identity can change within the same human, it is not clear what or who will be punished or rewarded for the actions of the human, as opposed to the thoughts of the substance, and as opposed the actions of the person – or whether the one human will be held accountable for all three. This ambiguity is inconsistent with the rules of accountability in morality. Further, Locke does not argue whether the soul is material or not, and so does not reveal anything about the nature of the effects the soul has on personal identity. As well as this, Locke argues that personal identity, and substance can be transferred to a different human. However, he does not make clear whether or not this means there are any new persons or substances, or whether they are continuously being recycled when a new human enters the mortal world (Atherton 1994,