Functionalism analogizes the mind to computer processors and defines mental states as a function of causal relations to external stimuli. With input stimuli, our brain uses the representations along with other factors such as desire to produce an output behavior. Unlike the EM theory, functionalism states that the mental processes is contained in the head—a ‘black-box’ where all the cognitive processes take place.3 The EM theory states that it is not location, but functionality that determines whether a process or an object in the environment is part of the mind. Clark and Chalmers endorse the parity principle, which asserts that physical objects that serve functionally the same as an internal brain process “is part of the cognitive process.”4 Clark and Chalmers present an example of Otto and Inga to illustrate the parity principle. Otto has Alzheimer’s disease and must rely on his notebook to remember the directions to the Museum while Inga relies on her memory traces in the brain. The notebook stores information, is accessible for retrieval, is reliable, and is subject to loss or damage. The notebook serves the same function as memory; and is considered as Otto’s memory. Hence, the parity principle implies functionalism, and Clark and Chalmers claim that a notebook is a physical apparatus that is functionally equivalent to brain processes. It also does not matter where the mental state is realized, inside the brain or in the physical environment. Therefore, the EM theory concludes the mind is not only in the head but is also extended to physical objects in the external
Functionalism analogizes the mind to computer processors and defines mental states as a function of causal relations to external stimuli. With input stimuli, our brain uses the representations along with other factors such as desire to produce an output behavior. Unlike the EM theory, functionalism states that the mental processes is contained in the head—a ‘black-box’ where all the cognitive processes take place.3 The EM theory states that it is not location, but functionality that determines whether a process or an object in the environment is part of the mind. Clark and Chalmers endorse the parity principle, which asserts that physical objects that serve functionally the same as an internal brain process “is part of the cognitive process.”4 Clark and Chalmers present an example of Otto and Inga to illustrate the parity principle. Otto has Alzheimer’s disease and must rely on his notebook to remember the directions to the Museum while Inga relies on her memory traces in the brain. The notebook stores information, is accessible for retrieval, is reliable, and is subject to loss or damage. The notebook serves the same function as memory; and is considered as Otto’s memory. Hence, the parity principle implies functionalism, and Clark and Chalmers claim that a notebook is a physical apparatus that is functionally equivalent to brain processes. It also does not matter where the mental state is realized, inside the brain or in the physical environment. Therefore, the EM theory concludes the mind is not only in the head but is also extended to physical objects in the external