Admiral Mitscher and the Battle of the Philippine Sea
As World War II, came to a close in Europe, the war in the Pacific for the United States against Japan continued to escalate with the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Also known as the Battle of the Marianas, Admiral Marc Mitscher led an entire armada with four air craft carriers. After his rise through the ranks as a naval officer, his accumulation of war and aviation experience gave him the ability to influence United States air power and lead them to tactical, strategic, and operational success in the Battle of the Philippine Sea of June, 1944 against the Japanese commander, Admiral Soemu Toyoda.
First, the foundations that led the United States to tactical superiority over Japan were …show more content…
If Mitscher’s pilots had never learned to trust him during their tactical endeavours, then performing the final operation would have been fatal. The high demand on each airman would be significantly more difficult because they would not have a trusted leader in which they could rely. Without a leader, being told that enemy forces existed hundreds of miles away that would have to be killed right before dusk, would be nearly impossible to achieve. They had to put their faith in his decision to return them home somehow and that. Secondly, since his leadership did prevail tactically, it did operationally as well. Japan’s air power no longer amounted to anything significant. The majority of their trained pilots were killed in action, and had little to no purpose since many of them now did not have the training up to par with those that had attacked Pearl Harbor. This occurred due to the accuracy of the pilots and willingness to fight, which can be traced back to Mitscher’s influence. Finally, during aquatic warfare, aircraft carriers were often the deciding factors of the battle and provided a navy with aviation capabilities. So, Japanese aircraft carriers were rendered useless and were only used for show since three of them had been sunk or nearly destroyed. They had no purpose for “the remainder of the war” (Wukovits 48). Thus, powerful naval aviation sector of Japan that
As World War II, came to a close in Europe, the war in the Pacific for the United States against Japan continued to escalate with the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Also known as the Battle of the Marianas, Admiral Marc Mitscher led an entire armada with four air craft carriers. After his rise through the ranks as a naval officer, his accumulation of war and aviation experience gave him the ability to influence United States air power and lead them to tactical, strategic, and operational success in the Battle of the Philippine Sea of June, 1944 against the Japanese commander, Admiral Soemu Toyoda.
First, the foundations that led the United States to tactical superiority over Japan were …show more content…
If Mitscher’s pilots had never learned to trust him during their tactical endeavours, then performing the final operation would have been fatal. The high demand on each airman would be significantly more difficult because they would not have a trusted leader in which they could rely. Without a leader, being told that enemy forces existed hundreds of miles away that would have to be killed right before dusk, would be nearly impossible to achieve. They had to put their faith in his decision to return them home somehow and that. Secondly, since his leadership did prevail tactically, it did operationally as well. Japan’s air power no longer amounted to anything significant. The majority of their trained pilots were killed in action, and had little to no purpose since many of them now did not have the training up to par with those that had attacked Pearl Harbor. This occurred due to the accuracy of the pilots and willingness to fight, which can be traced back to Mitscher’s influence. Finally, during aquatic warfare, aircraft carriers were often the deciding factors of the battle and provided a navy with aviation capabilities. So, Japanese aircraft carriers were rendered useless and were only used for show since three of them had been sunk or nearly destroyed. They had no purpose for “the remainder of the war” (Wukovits 48). Thus, powerful naval aviation sector of Japan that