Concurring with Frederick Taylor, in Ian Kershaw’s Why Did German Democracy Fail, Harold James argues that the depression alone did not engender the collapse of Weimar, rather a decade of economic volatility delegitimized the Weimar government in the eyes of the public. However, in contradistinction with Taylor, James callously argues that the bulk of this volatility was not caused by the periods of hyperinflation and massive unemployment, rather it was the ridiculous demands of the labor movement that paralyzed Weimar leadership, effectively exacerbating the depression. Parroting the classical liberal argument previously made by Knut Borchardt, James argues that wage increases demanded by the leftist labor movements throughout the 1920s had
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Among them, the best argument is provided by Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, who argues that the political failures by Weimar’s leaders throughout the 1920s were caused by unavoidable economic calamity. Rejecting Borchardt’s thesis, Holtfrerich argues that the inflationary monetary policy pursued between 1922 and 1923, was both consequential and unavoidable. As the Entente powers were still requiring reparation payments prior to the passage of Dawes Plan in 1924, the German government had little choice but to pursue a form of monetary policy that led to a liquidity trap. Furthermore, in the depression era, whether labor had continued to demand payments for unemployment, the rate of unemployment would have still be extremely high as a result of the crash of global markets. Showcasing the minimal role German labor played in starting both economic crises of the 1920s, Holtfrerich makes clear that the Germans were primarily victims of economic physics beyond their control. By detailing the German’s utter lack of agency in causing the global economic cataclysm, Holtfrerich successfully exposes the reductionist hypotheses floated by both Borchardt and James who callously place primacy on minor economic gains by …show more content…
Through the “paradox of inflation,” Widdig draws on personal accounts to unearth the psychological traumas that accompanied that arbitrary addition of zeros to scraps of paper. Drawing on his grandfather’s account of the time, Widdig illuminates how inflation was spoken about like “an illness,” an incurable plague that engulfed every aspect of society. Weimar in the 1920s was disorientating, as droves of German’s “fill[ed] up whole wheelbarrow[s] with banknotes” in an attempt to buy groceries. Widdig argues that in this consumer society, monetary instability could not be confined to the economic realm. Rather, economic instability was such an “overwhelmingly central” force, that it “invaded all spheres of society” displacing aforementioned sociocultural relationships far from their traditional contexts. According to Widdig, this destabilization of the traditional sociocultural order at the hands of monetary collapse, would prompt a “longing for security.” In articulating this point, Widdig sounds similar to the Peukert and Weitz, who argue that Weimar collapsed under a “crisis of modernity.” However, while Widdig argues that the diffusion of preexisting sociocultural boundaries throughout the inflationary period would encourage a conservative shift in later politics, he explicitly states that it
Among them, the best argument is provided by Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, who argues that the political failures by Weimar’s leaders throughout the 1920s were caused by unavoidable economic calamity. Rejecting Borchardt’s thesis, Holtfrerich argues that the inflationary monetary policy pursued between 1922 and 1923, was both consequential and unavoidable. As the Entente powers were still requiring reparation payments prior to the passage of Dawes Plan in 1924, the German government had little choice but to pursue a form of monetary policy that led to a liquidity trap. Furthermore, in the depression era, whether labor had continued to demand payments for unemployment, the rate of unemployment would have still be extremely high as a result of the crash of global markets. Showcasing the minimal role German labor played in starting both economic crises of the 1920s, Holtfrerich makes clear that the Germans were primarily victims of economic physics beyond their control. By detailing the German’s utter lack of agency in causing the global economic cataclysm, Holtfrerich successfully exposes the reductionist hypotheses floated by both Borchardt and James who callously place primacy on minor economic gains by …show more content…
Through the “paradox of inflation,” Widdig draws on personal accounts to unearth the psychological traumas that accompanied that arbitrary addition of zeros to scraps of paper. Drawing on his grandfather’s account of the time, Widdig illuminates how inflation was spoken about like “an illness,” an incurable plague that engulfed every aspect of society. Weimar in the 1920s was disorientating, as droves of German’s “fill[ed] up whole wheelbarrow[s] with banknotes” in an attempt to buy groceries. Widdig argues that in this consumer society, monetary instability could not be confined to the economic realm. Rather, economic instability was such an “overwhelmingly central” force, that it “invaded all spheres of society” displacing aforementioned sociocultural relationships far from their traditional contexts. According to Widdig, this destabilization of the traditional sociocultural order at the hands of monetary collapse, would prompt a “longing for security.” In articulating this point, Widdig sounds similar to the Peukert and Weitz, who argue that Weimar collapsed under a “crisis of modernity.” However, while Widdig argues that the diffusion of preexisting sociocultural boundaries throughout the inflationary period would encourage a conservative shift in later politics, he explicitly states that it