In 2006 the voters of Washington state passed the Energy Independence Act (EIA) through a ballot initiative in the November mid-term elections. The initiative was championed by the organization Washingtonians for Energy Security (WES). The EIA is a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) requiring electric utilities serving at least 25,000 customers to produce 15% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020 (Energy Independence Act of 2006). The EIA also seeks to increase energy conservation efforts by requiring qualifying utilities to invest in energy saving measures such as efficiency of use, production, or distribution (Energy Independence Act of 2006).
The ballot initiative came at a time when political decision making systems are largely …show more content…
For example, hydroelectric generation is only considered an eligible renewable resource if the facility was completed after 1999 and must not divert any new water (Energy Independence Act of 2006). Another example of how the EIA is an expert driven policy is in the description of cogeneration requirements. Where “the reduction in load due to high-efficiency cogeneration shall be: Calculated as the ratio of the fuel chargeable to power heat rate of the cogeneration facility compared to the heat rate on a new and clean basis of a best-commercially available technology combined-cycle natural gas-fired combustion turbine” (Energy Independence Act of 2006, RCW 19.285.040 (1)(d)). To the lay person this statement means nothing but to the WES experts who created the EIA this statement is straightforward. Furthermore, the EIA’s systems of rules, penalties, exceptions and oversights are indicative of very institutionalized policy. The increasingly technocratic nature of environmental politics and policy is due to a reliance on scientific and institutional knowledge to inform decisions in attempts to reduce uncertainty (Fischer 2000, Sarewitz 2004). The common perception is that with science comes more information, this information in turn reduces uncertainty. At the surface this idea seems …show more content…
Wherein he describes four idealized roles: honest broker, issue advocate, science arbiter and pure scientist (Pielke 2007). Although, Pielke does allow for a fifth role in a stealth issue advocate. Of these four types the WES members would fit most appropriately within the role of issue advocates. As they are aligning themselves with a group (or creating their own in this case) and seek to promote their interests through policy (Pielke 2007). It is important to make the distinction that the WES were acting as issue advocates and not as stealth issue advocates. As stealth issue advocates work to promote their issues through a stance of scientific objectivity (Pielke 2007). The WES were abundantly clear on their stance as renewable energy advocates. Exemplified by Washington’s voter pamphlet “We can either burn more fossil fuels like coal that pollute the air. Or we can use more clean, affordable renewable energy like wind and solar power” (Voters’ Pamphlet 2006, p.18). However, due to the subtle nature of the stealth issue advocate role, the potential exists for the WES to be alternatively motivated. Though, this possibility is highly unlikely as the well organized and well established NW Energy Coalition would not be a proud supporter and integral part of WES if any signs of duplicity were
The ballot initiative came at a time when political decision making systems are largely …show more content…
For example, hydroelectric generation is only considered an eligible renewable resource if the facility was completed after 1999 and must not divert any new water (Energy Independence Act of 2006). Another example of how the EIA is an expert driven policy is in the description of cogeneration requirements. Where “the reduction in load due to high-efficiency cogeneration shall be: Calculated as the ratio of the fuel chargeable to power heat rate of the cogeneration facility compared to the heat rate on a new and clean basis of a best-commercially available technology combined-cycle natural gas-fired combustion turbine” (Energy Independence Act of 2006, RCW 19.285.040 (1)(d)). To the lay person this statement means nothing but to the WES experts who created the EIA this statement is straightforward. Furthermore, the EIA’s systems of rules, penalties, exceptions and oversights are indicative of very institutionalized policy. The increasingly technocratic nature of environmental politics and policy is due to a reliance on scientific and institutional knowledge to inform decisions in attempts to reduce uncertainty (Fischer 2000, Sarewitz 2004). The common perception is that with science comes more information, this information in turn reduces uncertainty. At the surface this idea seems …show more content…
Wherein he describes four idealized roles: honest broker, issue advocate, science arbiter and pure scientist (Pielke 2007). Although, Pielke does allow for a fifth role in a stealth issue advocate. Of these four types the WES members would fit most appropriately within the role of issue advocates. As they are aligning themselves with a group (or creating their own in this case) and seek to promote their interests through policy (Pielke 2007). It is important to make the distinction that the WES were acting as issue advocates and not as stealth issue advocates. As stealth issue advocates work to promote their issues through a stance of scientific objectivity (Pielke 2007). The WES were abundantly clear on their stance as renewable energy advocates. Exemplified by Washington’s voter pamphlet “We can either burn more fossil fuels like coal that pollute the air. Or we can use more clean, affordable renewable energy like wind and solar power” (Voters’ Pamphlet 2006, p.18). However, due to the subtle nature of the stealth issue advocate role, the potential exists for the WES to be alternatively motivated. Though, this possibility is highly unlikely as the well organized and well established NW Energy Coalition would not be a proud supporter and integral part of WES if any signs of duplicity were