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73 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Van Den Haag view |
Pro Capital punishment |
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What are the two central issues about Capitol Punishment? |
deterrence and justice |
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Haags response to uneven distribution of the death penalty |
the moral status of CP and its distribution are distinct issues |
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Haags response to miscarriages of justice |
as long as the benefits of CP outweigh the costs, then we should keep it |
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Haags response to the claim that capital punishment encourages unlawful killing |
if this is true, then imprisonment encourages kidnapping and fines encourage burgular, which is absurd |
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Haags response to capitol punishment is too expensive |
justice is more important than monetary costs |
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Haags response to CP violates human rights |
it is the murderer doing it to themselves. The idea that there is an inviable right to life, is no more plausible than the possibility that one will forfeit there right to life by murdering someone |
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Haag commonsense argument |
-If punishment 1 is more feared than punishment 2, then punishment 1 will deter more potential criminals than punishment 2 -CP is more feared than life in prison -Therefore, CP will deter more potential criminals than life in prison |
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Jeffery Reiman views |
Against Capitol punishment |
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Reiman preliminary claim |
it doesn't follow solely from the fact that one deserves some punishment that we ought to administer |
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Reiman progress in civilization |
this is characterized by a lower tolerance for one's own pain and that suffered by others |
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Reiman's two conditions under which we ought to not reduce the horrible things we do to others |
1. it would be unjust to do so 2. It would make our life more dangerous in doing so |
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Reimans two responses to Haag's common sense argument |
1. The 1st premise assumes that less feared punishment doesn't already deter all who could be detered 2. If the commonsense argument succeeds, then it proves too much (i.e. we ought to administer the most feared punishment) |
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Reimans reason for why execution is horrible |
it is analogous to pain and subjugation because it is torture |
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Reiman's argument against the injustice of refusing to execute murderers |
1. progress in civilization requires that we refuse to do horrible things to others unless refusing amounts to an injustice 2. refusing to do horrible things to others does not amount to an injustice, unless the alternative falls short of the bottom end of justice 3. life in prison does not fall short of the bottom end of justice 4. Capitol Punishment is more horrible than life in prison 5. Therefore, refusing to impose capital punishment does not amount to an injustice |
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Active euthanasia |
involves a deliberate action intended to cause the death of a person |
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Passive euthanasia |
involves withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining or life prolonging measures in order to allow for the death of a person |
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Voluntary euthanasia |
with the consent of the dying person |
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Nonvoluntary euthanasia |
without the consent of the dying person |
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Involuntary euthanasia |
against the will of the dying person |
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Two common considerations in favor of euthanasia |
compassion for the painfully and terminally ill concern for human dignity and freedom of choice |
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Dyck |
against euthanasia |
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benemortasia |
allows for some actions and omissions that may cause or hasten death, but never because they cause or hasten death
(intent behind the act is different) |
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Euthanasia |
intent to cause death |
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Benemortasia |
intent is not death, but it may happen |
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Suicide |
an act that was the immediate intent of ending life and has no other purpose |
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Dycks four reasons why suicide is wrong |
1. It rejects the meaningfulness of life 2. It deprives others of access to you 3. It may cause years of suffering for others 4. It implies that others may commit suicide if they believe their lives to be meaningless |
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Dyck's intent criterion |
it is always impermissable to intend harm |
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Objections to Dycks intent criterion |
1. It's not always impermissible to intend pain as a means to an end 2. it is always impermissible to intend pain as an end |
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Two worries regarding the legalization of voluntary euthanasia |
1. Slippery slope argument. could lead to involuntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia 2. even if we don't get bad social consequences physicians cannot take part in it because it goes against the cardinal principle of medical practice which is to do no harm |
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James rachels view |
euthanasia is permissable |
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What does rachels say about AMA position |
it is wrong |
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AMA position |
while passive euthanasia is permissable, active euthanasia is not |
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Apparant justification for passive euthanasia |
you can allow passive to reduce or not prolong suffering |
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Rachels response regarding active euthanasia |
active euthanasia is preferable on those grounds, which is why we should allow active if we allow passive because active will take the suffering away faster |
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Death is a great evil |
you are asking physicians to be the casue of the great evil. If death is such a great evil, it is common for the physicians to not to want to be the cause of it |
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Rachels response to death being a great evil |
in some cases the continuation of life is as great of an evil as death |
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Smith Jones case |
no morally relevant differnce between killing and letting die
Smith kills the child and Jones lets the child die because they would get money for the kid |
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Standard abortion argument |
1. it is wrong to kill innocent persons 2. Fetuses are innocent persons 3. Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus |
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Argument for a fetus is an innocent person |
1. There is no non-arbitrary dividing line between the zygote and the person it will become 2. Therefore, the zygote is a person |
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Refutation by ananlogy for the argument for fetus being an innocent perosn |
1. There is no dividing line between the acorn adn the oak tree it will become 2. Therefore, acorns are oak trees |
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Argument 2 for fetus is an innocent person |
1. All persons have a right to life 2. A fetus is a potential person 3. Therefore, a fetus has right to life |
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Refutation by analogy 2 |
1. The president has a right to command missiles 2, I am a potential president 3. Therefore, I have the right to command missiles this is false so it refutes the previous arguemtn |
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Thomson's view on abortion |
conditional pro choice |
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The extreme view on abortion |
1. All persons have a right to life 2. The fetus is a person 3. The mother has the right to bodily autonomy 4. The right to life is stronger than the right to bodily autonomy 5. Therefore, abortion is impermissible |
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Thomson's argument against the extreme view of abortion |
1. all persons have a right to life 2. The famous violinist is a person 3. You have the right to bodily autonomy 4. The right to life is stronger than the right to bodily autonomy 5. therefore, it is impermissible to unplug yourself from the violinist
this is false so the extreme view is false also |
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The right to life |
The right to have one's life sustained |
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Thompson argument for rejection to the right to life |
Famous violinist and Henry fonda case (touching someone's brow to get better) |
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The right to not be killed |
you have the right to not be killed |
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Thompon's argument against |
famous violinist and self defense |
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Thomson's view about the right to life |
you have the right to not be killed unjustly |
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The right to life argument Thomson |
1. The right to life is the right to not be killed unjustly 2. To be unjust to someone is depriving someone of something they have a right to 3. The right ot life by itself does not get you the right to use someone's body 4. abortion is permissible In cases where a woman doesn't grant the right to her body and she will not die from having the child, abortion is wrong |
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People seeds |
even though you open your window voluntarily, when you take steps to prevent these seeds from coming in by using mesh and the mesh is defective you are still not granting the right to use your home |
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Good Samaritan |
will risk harm to help others |
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Minimally decent Samaritan |
does minimum to help someone |
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Warren is pro choice or pro life? |
pro choice |
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Warren's two senses of a human being |
Genetic and moral sense |
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Genetic |
having a human genetic code |
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Moral |
a full fledged member of the moral community |
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Standard anti-abortion argument |
1. it is wrong to kill an innocent human being 2. A fetus is human being 3. Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus |
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standard abortion argument 1.2 |
It is wrong to kill an innocent human being (moral sense) A fetus is an innocent human being (genetic sense) Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus |
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Warrans critique on 1.2 |
Though both premises are highly plausible, the argument is invalid due to its equivocation on 'human being' |
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standard abortion argument 1.3 |
It is wrong to kill an innocent human being (moral sense) A fetus is an innocent human being (moral sense) Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus |
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Warrans critique on 1.3 |
valid, but the second premise begs the question
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standard abortion argument 1.4 |
It is wrong to kill an innocent human being (genetic sense) A fetus is an innocent human being (genetic sense) Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus |
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Warrans critique on 1.4 |
valid, but he 1st premise begs the question |
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Five attributes warren associates with being a person |
1. Conciousness 2. Reasoning 3. Self-motivated 4. Capacity to communicate 5. Self-awareness
(dont need all to be a person, but if you have none you are not a person) |
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Warren's claim regarding early stage fetuses |
They aren't people because they do not have any of the 5 traits |
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What are the 2 objections to Warren's claim regarding fetuses |
1. Fetus's are like a person 2. Fetuses are potential people |
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Warren's response to fetuses are like a person |
1. The late stage fetus is no different than an animal 2. The late stage fetus is no more person like than a fish 3. A late stage fetus is no more person like than a new born guppy 4. A large stage fetus is no more person like than many other creatures to which we don't attirbute personhood |
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Warren's response to fetus's are potential people |
the rights of actual person's always override the right of a potential |
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Marquis: What's wrong with killing? What explains the misfortune of premature death? |
1. Not the loss of biological life 2. The loss of one's conscious life, but not just any conscious life 3. The loss of the "future goods of "conciousness" |
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Marquis Future like ours (FLO) |
friendships, intellectual pursuits, completed projects, aesthetic enjoyments, physical pleasures, achievement of our goals |